v0.6.0.

A security-and-reliability minor that also ships inline Compose stacks: paste YAML instead of cloning. Under the hood, a full-system audit closed a privilege-escalation path, made rate limits and audit logs see real client IPs behind Traefik, cleared every production dependency advisory, and stopped multi-gigabyte backups from ever entering the panel's heap.

Added

• Inline Compose stacks. Services can store a pasted Docker Compose file (256 KiB cap) instead of a git clone: the schema enforces type: compose and rejects combining it with a repo URL, the server validates the file server-side (dry-run preview endpoint) and re- materialises it into the workspace before every deploy, and the new Compose tab offers Save and Save & redeploy.
• Database indexes for hot lookups. services.server_id, webhooks.service_id and databases.project_id were full-table scans; SQLite does not auto-index FK columns.

Changed

• Real client IPs behind Traefik. The panel now trusts one proxy hop by default (NINEDEPLOY_TRUST_PROXY): rate limits are enforced per actual client instead of one shared bucket for the whole instance, and audit rows record the true source address. Set it to false when the panel is exposed directly.
• SSH password bootstrap refuses fast. Password authentication was accepted by the schema but never worked (BatchMode=yes disables all prompting and the password was never wired to sshpass). It now fails immediately with an actionable message; install a key and use key auth.
• The CLI defaults to https:// for non-loopback server URLs, so the bearer token no longer rides plaintext HTTP to a remote host (loopback keeps http://; type an explicit scheme to override).
• Scheduled backup failures are no longer silent. A failed scheduled backup lands a failed row in the UI and fires the notification channels; MySQL/MariaDB dumps run --single-transaction --quick, so backups no longer lock live databases or produce inconsistent dumps.
• CI ships tested images only. The :edge image (what --channel=main installs) is published only after the full suite and integration tests pass, and the release prune no longer deletes the CI-pushed edge tags.

Fixed

• Privilege escalation via scheduled deploy jobs. A workspace member could wrap an operator-created PM2/compose service in a cron job and reach host command execution. Scheduled deploys now authorize against the service owner's privileges, exactly like manual and webhook deploys.
• Editing an env var no longer corrupts secrets. Inline edits used to silently flip isSecret to false and a single typed character could overwrite the stored secret; the classification is preserved and failures surface as toasts.
• The panel no longer crashes during self-update on hosts without /bin/bash — a failed updater launch records a finished, failed state instead of an uncaught exception.
• Deploy logs stop freezing the tab. Live output keeps a bounded tail and flushes on an interval (the old per-message re-join was O(n²)) and reconnects a dropped stream; the terminal session also survives the fullscreen toggle.
• Webhook replays are rejected. Provider delivery ids are deduplicated for 24 hours, closing the window where a captured payload could redeploy an old commit.
• System export is crash-consistent. The archive carries a VACUUM INTO snapshot of the database instead of a tar raced against live writes; remote backup transfers stream, so multi-GB dumps no longer buffer in the panel's heap (which also hosts the deploy worker).
• CLI sessions survive past 15 minutes — the CLI persists the refresh token and retries through a single-flight refresh; server URLs default to https for non-loopback hosts and the JWT secret no longer appears in docker run argv (ps / docker inspect).
• Slug collisions are impossible again. services.slug is globally unique at the database level (it mints container, volume and router names) after a one-time dedup; slug uniqueness was application-layer only since the projects overhaul.
• Dependency advisories cleared — fast-uri (8× HIGH, SSRF/host confusion) and qs (2× MODERATE, DoS) pinned past their vulnerable ranges; pnpm audit --prod is clean.
• The schema-drift CI guard can actually fail now, /v1/auth/token answers instead of always 401ing, Traefik certificate backups follow the configured data dir, concurrent routing writes no longer drop just- added domains, PR preview creation survives the slug race, and the installer no longer discards local modifications without --force.